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Abstract. This article evaluates the effect of the overdraft facility (or line of credit) policy 
by comparing a large sample of overdraft facilitated firms and matched non-overdraft 
facilitated firms from Eastern Europe at sector level. The sample firms are compared 
with respect to rates of different performance indicators including: technical efficiency 
(a Data Envelopment Analysis – DEA – approach is applied to estimate technical ef-
ficiency level for individual sectors), production workers trained, expenditures of R&D, 
and export activity. In order to avoid the selectivity problem, propensity score matching 
methodologies are adopted. Results suggest that a certain level of overdraft facility given 
to a firm would be needed to stimulate investment in R&D, which will eventually result 
in growth in productivity.
Keywords: overdraft facility policy, propensity score matching, technical efficiency, Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), bootstrapping.
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1. Introduction
The overdraft facility1 policy from private financial institutions provides financial sup-
port to increase firms’ accessibility to private financing sources. However, according to 
the IMF (2005) the overdraft facility policy has often been criticized for its negative 
effects by impairing the development of an innovative private financial sector and for 
making firm highly dependent on government support policy measures. Even though 
there have been some qualitative remarks on the effectiveness of the policy, an evalu-
ation of the overdraft facility policy has not been conducted systematically in terms 
1 An overdraft facility is defined as a flexible account that allows firms to draw upon in the event their 
account balance becomes negative.
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of methodology and data, especially in Eastern European Union Industrial firms. This 
study aims to fill the gap in the existing literature.
In this work, we evaluate the effect of the overdraft facility policy in terms of Human 
Capital (production workers trained), Technological Capital (expenditures of R&D), 
competitiveness (sales export level) and the firm’s technical efficiency in the Eastern 
European Union Industrial firms, by comparing overdraft facilitated firms and non-
overdraft facilitated firms. The amount of funds allocated to the overdraft facility policy 
is huge and the number of targeted firms is large. Therefore, we need to investigate its 
effectiveness and to provide background information for further evolution of the policy.
This work utilizes an original dataset that covers manufacturing firms in 11 Eastern 
Europe Countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mol-
dova, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). Moreover, we analyze the ef-
fectiveness of the overdraft facility in 4 industrial sectors (Beverages, Food, Garments, 
and Metals and machinery).
Methodologically, reliable policy evaluation should solve the ‘selectivity’ problem. 
According to Muthen and Jöreskog (1983), selectivity problems can occur whenever 
one tries to estimate population parameters from a nonrandom sample. The sample 
may be nonrandom because only firms with certain characteristics are selected into the 
sample (sample selection), or because firms participate voluntarily in the sample (self-
selection). Selective samples can also occur because firms fall out of the sample for 
various reasons, despite an initial random sample (attrition). According to Jaffe (2002), 
if we cannot control the selectivity problem, we might over- or under-estimate the true 
effects of the policy.
In order to deal with the selectivity issue, we adopt propensity score matching estima-
tors, which have recently been applied to firm-level studies (Yasar, Rejesus 2005; Loof, 
Heshmati 2005; Oh et al. 2009). Propensity score matching was chosen because: (i) it 
reduces (although does not eliminate) selection biases, (ii) it reduces the limitation from 
matching on many observable variables for finite data, and (iii) it is best suited to the 
structure of the available data.
This study is organized as follows. The following section introduces the economic envi-
ronment of the Eastern European Union Industrial firms and the existing overdraft facil-
ity policy schemes. Section 3 briefly explains the methodologies of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) Frontiers (with Bootstrap procedure) and propensity score matching. 
Section 4 describes the data and it presents the key descriptive statistics. The empirical 
results are discussed in Sect. 5. The final section summarizes and concludes this study.
2. Background
2.1. The Eastern European Union companies
The EU enlargement to 27 countries in 2004 and 2007 constitutes a historical bench-
mark in the forming of the European space. In contrast to previous enlargements, the 
entering of Eastern European countries has peculiar characteristics due to the large 
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number of nations entering the EU and due to the heterogeneity in its parameters and 
levels of development (Hay 2003: 13). 
In terms of rent per capita, the set of the countries of Eastern Europe was placed in 
2004 in 4,380 Euros (current exchange rates) and 9,100 (PPP) Euros, respectively, 
which supposed 20% and 40% of the per capita income in the Europe of the fifteen. By 
countries the issue was somewhat different: in the case of Rumania the number in PPP 
was of 24% whereas in Hungary the per capita income was almost a 70% of the EU15. 
Another trait to consider is the characteristic of its productive structure: in the countries 
of the enlargement, more than 20% of the population was occupied in the agricultural 
sector whereas in the EU15 that percentile was of 4.8%. Among the countries one can 
highlight are Romania (40%), Bulgaria (28%) and Poland (26%). As far as foreign trade 
is concerned, the entailment of the 12 countries with the EU15 (exports and imports) ap-
proximately reached 60% of its trade balance whereas for the EU15 that value remains 
below 2.5% (Alcalá 2004).
At the micro level, it is interesting to analyze the behavior of companies from the point 
of their technical efficiency, as well as of their contribution to the value chain, which 
will allow shedding light on some conclusions on policy priorities, not only among 
the countries but among the productive sectors. In this context, a variety of features 
distinguish the business environment in sectors from those typically observed in the 
OECD (2001).
We will begin by mentioning the most remarkable and generally acknowledged among 
them, as identified by Tybout (1992): (a) Market size. Although some economies are 
quite large, most are not. Hence, with the exception of countries such as Poland or Ro-
mania, the size of the domestic market for manufactured products is relatively limited; 
(b) Access to manufactured inputs. The set of choices of domestically produced interme-
diate inputs and capital equipment is also often limited; (c) Human capital. Low rates of 
secondary education (less than 90%) and an insufficiency of technicians and scientists 
in countries like Hungary or Lithuania also affect the mix of goods manufactured and 
the factor proportions used to produce them; (d) Infrastructure. Roads, ports, airports, 
communication facilities, power, and safe water access also tend to be relatively limited 
in all countries, although they especially affect countries like Bulgaria or Moldova; 
(e) Financial markets. Credit markets are also relatively thin in countries like Romania 
or Moldova; (f) Volatility. Macroeconomic and relative price volatility is typically more 
extreme in countries like Romania or Moldova than in other economies like the Czech 
Republic or Lithuania. And finally (h) Governance. Red tape is also relatively high in 
countries like Poland or Romania, for this reason the protection of contract enforcement 
can be problematic.
2.2. The overdraft facility policy
According to Lerner (2002), firms, especially young and high-tech firms, face great 
difficulties in accessing the loan market due to asymmetric information which arises 
from the lack of public information on standardized financial statements and further 
growth potential. In this context Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that in equilibrium 
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a loan market might be characterized by credit rationing. Due to imperfect information 
and followed adverse selection and moral hazard, market failure occurs in the firms 
loan market and banks are more likely to demand collateral in loan contracts (Cowling 
1998), and it is often difficult for firms to borrow funds, even at higher interest rates. 
There exist some recently published studies aimed at analyzing and evaluating over-
draft facility policy schemes in various countries. In the case of the UK, Cowling and 
Mitchell (1997), the overdraft facility policy scheme has successfully addressed a real 
capital constraint for the majority of firms which applied to the scheme.
In the case of Malaysia, Boocock and Shariff (2005) evaluated the overdraft facility 
policy scheme in terms of finance additionality, i.e. an increase in accessibility to loans, 
and economic additionality, i.e. utilizing the funds to benefit their own firms and to 
generate positive spillovers. These authors concluded that Malaysian overdraft facility 
policy schemes in general failed to satisfy financial additionality, though it showed some 
positive outcomes in relation to economic additionality.
Kang (2005) and IMF (2005) shared the views that the nonselective financial support 
of firms was one of the key sources of the sluggish firms restructuring process after the 
financial crisis. They argued that a too generous and non-selective guarantee provision 
worsened the firm market environment in two ways: the first was the effect of crowding 
out the private financial sector. The second and long-term negative effect was to make 
firms become more dependent on public support.
In the case of Korea, Lee (2006) criticized that firms with low creditability will gradu-
ally receive overdraft facility by excessive supply. It will eventually increase the credit 
default ratio and hence financial difficulties for government in the end.
Using a data from a cross-section of Bulgarian firms Gatti and Love (2008) estimate the 
impact of access to credit, as proxied by indicators of whether firms have access to a 
credit line or overdraft facility, on productivity. These authors find credit to be positively 
and strongly associated with TFP.
Augier, Dovis and Gasiorek (2012) focuse on the role of the business environment in 
understanding differences in the performance of Moroccan firms. The evidence on the 
relationship between credit and productivity is strongly indicative of credit resources 
misallocation in Morocco.
Kasseeah (2011) studies the link between firm performance and firm characteristics of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Mauritius. This author observes that the 
growth of SMEs in Mauritius depends mainly on access to finance and firm size. Ac-
cess to finance is captured through access to overdraft facilities, line of credit and self 
reported measures of access to finance. 
Butler and Cornaggia (2011) study the relation between access to finance and produc-
tivity. These authors exploit an exogenous shift in demand for a product to expose how 
producers adapt their productivity in the presence of varying levels of access to finance. 
These authors find that production increases the most over the sample period in areas 
with relatively strong access to finance.
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Using a panel of Chinese manufacturing firms over the period 2001–2007, Chen and 
Guariglia (2011) find that, especially for illiquid firms, productivity is strongly con-
strained by the availability of internal finance. Furthermore, these authors find higher 
sensitivities of productivity to cash flow for private exporters, but lower sensitivities 
for foreign exporters.
Finally, Clarke, Cull and Kisunko (2012) study how country and firm characteristics af-
fected firms’ financial constraints and their likelihood of survival during the early phase 
of the recent global financial crisis in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA). These 
authors find that financial constraints during the crisis were less severe in countries with 
well-established foreign banks, and that changes in the severity of financial constraints 
were more pronounced for large firms than others during the crisis. Controlling for other 
relevant characteristics, firms were more likely to survive the crisis if they had access 
to external credit.
3. Methodology
Although there is no consensus among researchers regarding the way to establish the 
process to evaluate the influence of environmental variables on service efficiency levels, 
in this paper we have attempted to detect the repercussion of certain exogenous factors 
on the said efficiency levels by using a two-stage process made up of the following 
steps:
1) Obtaining the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) efficiency index. In order to 
calculate efficiency, the behavior of each unit observed is optimized, thus deter-
mining the efficient production frontier by means of linear segments based on 
the Decision Making Units (DMUs) that operate with the best practices (Cooper 
et al. 2001: 3).
2) Using re-sampling methods and bootstrapping techniques. We have opted for the 
traditional application of determinist mathematical models, and as a complement 
to them, we have used the re-sampling methods and bootstrapping techniques, in 
accordance with the contribution by Simar and Wilson (2000).
3) Assessment of overdraft facility policy impact using Propensity Score Match-
ing (PSM). The objective of the matching is to construct treatment and control 
groups that are as similar as possible, so that the control group would resemble 
what would have happened to the beneficiaries in the absence of overdraft facility 
policy (Rosenbaum, Rubin 1983). The PSM estimation strategy requires multiple 
steps: (i) estimation of the propensity score, in terms of probability to have over-
draft facility given observable variables, (ii) the review of overlap and common 
support conditions (i.e. which firms are matched) and (iii) assessing matching 
quality (Rosenbaum, Rubin 1983; Frolich 2004; Abadie, Imbens 2006).
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4. Data and variables
The statistical source used for this analysis is the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys 
(ES). The ES collect data from key manufacturing and service sectors in every region 
of the world. The Surveys use standardized survey instruments and a uniform sampling 
methodology to minimize measurement error and to yield data that are comparable 
across the world’s economies.
In order to estimate technical efficiency with DEA, there exists considerable disagree-
ment in empirical literature on the definition of outputs (in the context of multiple-
outputs firms) of an industrial institution. Nevertheless, according to Coelli et al. (2005), 
a commonly-used classification of inputs involves five categories: capital (K), labour 
(L), energy (E), material inputs (M), and purchase services (S). However in our sample, 
Capital (K) and Purchased Services (S) are not available. 
To ensure the validity of the DEA model specification, an isotonicity test (according to 
Golany and Roll (1989)) was conducted. On the other hand, Smith (2000) argues that, in 
order to obtain correct and robust estimates of program effects using PSM, one need to 
use a broad set of observed firm characteristics in the estimation of the propensity score. 
We evaluated the effect of overdraft facility policy by observing various aspects of a 
firm’s performance. The outcome variables considered are: technical efficiency, R&D 
expenditures, export activities and production workers trained. The definition of vari-
ables including firm characteristics and outcomes are explained in Table 1.







Used as the measure of output for the production function 
estimation. For all countries, sales figures in local currency  
are converted into USD using PPP conversion factor  
to the official exchange rate ratio.
Capital Stock Book value of all fixed assets
1. For all countries, capital  
stock figures in local currency are converted into USD using 
PPP conversion factor to the official exchange rate ratio.
Labor cost Total expenditures on personnel
2. For all countries, labor cost 
figures in local currency are converted into USD using PPP 
conversion factor to the official exchange rate ratio.
Materials
Total costs of intermediate and raw materials used in  
production (excluding electricity, fuel, and water). For all 
countries, materials figures in local currency are converted  
into USD using PPP conversion factor to the official  
exchange rate ratio.
Energy Cost Total annual costs of electricity, fuel, and water.
Other Costs
Total annual costs of communications services, transport 
for goods (not including fuel), and rental of land/buildings, 
equipment, furniture, etc.










Dummy variable that takes value 1 whem firm is exporter  




Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has permanent 





Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm carried 







Dummy variable that take value 1 if the firm has  
an overdraft facility.
Matching
Age Difference between the year that the firm started operations  and current year.
Dummy Large 
firm













Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the country  





Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has private 
domestic owners and 0 if the firma has Foreign owners.
Notes: 1Total annual expenditure for purchases of: machinery and equipment (including vehicles), and
           land and buildings; 2Including wages, salaries, bonuses and social payments.
Source: Adapted from based in OECD (2001) Economic Studies No. 33, 2001/II, and from World
           Bank (2007).
Most of the variables listed above are related to the firm’s risks and growth potential. 
The size (sales and employment) of a firm is often taken to be a good proxy for the 
firm’s risk (Cowling, Westhead 1996). The amount of fixed capital can be related to the 
availability of collateral, which can act as a sorting device to decide which firms are to 
receive loans (Bester 1985). R&D and technical efficiency of firms are related to the 
future growth potentials as well as current profitability. The country income level (high/ 
upper-middle), and the existence of domestic owners are also used to control the firm’s 
risk, value, and growth potential in general.
End of Table 1
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The production workers trained will represent improvement in skill or the quality of 
employees. Variables indicating R&D and exporter status are introduced to observe if 
overdraft facility is used to enhance future productivity and expanded production facil-
ity. The level of technical efficiency might be an ultimate goal of such a government 
support policy. 
5. Estimation results
5.1. Estimation of technical efficiency
The results of the analysis of efficiency with monetary inputs are shown in Table 2. 
These results reveal the sensitivity of the efficiency measures with respect to sampling 
variation. The bias-corrected efficiency (BC) reveals that differences in measurement 
efficiency are of a different magnitude than when the original efficiency scores (N) are 
considered. For all of the manufacturing sectors, the efficiency declines slightly.
Having found that there exists wide variation in technical efficiency among the sample 
firms it is important and useful to understand the impact of the overdraft facility policy.
5.2. Propensity score matching estimation
To better construct the match, Table 3 below shows tests for mean differences between 
supported and non-supported groups for the impact and other key variables. Identifica-
tion of the matching technique to create the propensity score requires that the impact 
variables are independent of the treatment conditional on the propensity score. Few 
statistically significant differences between participants and non-participants were ob-
served, with the exception of the large and younger firms being more prevalent among 
those receiving overdraft facilities.
5.2.1. Estimation of the propensity score
The propensity score calculated to reflect the probability of a firm receiving overdraft 
facility, predicts that firms that are younger are more likely to receive benefits. The 
score, presented in Table 4, is predicted based upon a logit model controlling for fac-
tors such as age, age squared, and dummy variables (size firm, country income level, 
and domestic owners). Each additional year of existence (age) lowers the likelihood of 
receiving overdraft facilities. Country income level and owners characteristics do not 
seem to influence the likelihood of receiving overdraft facilities. 
5.2.2. Review of overlap and common support conditions
The distribution of the propensity score for the treatment and control groups is presented 
in Figure 1 to assess whether there are any differences in each group’s probability to 
receive overdraft facility. The distribution for the control group firms is more right 
skewed, i.e. conditioned towards those firms that are more likely to receive treatment. 
Observations with a propensity score below 0.10 were dropped, as they had a very low 
likelihood of being treated. The regions of common support show the observations with 
propensity scores that were matched are those where the treatment and control groups 
had similar propensity score values.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the CCR efficiency index (Normal and Bias-Corrected)  
by industry and country (year 2005)
Country/in-





















Bulgaria 0.781 0.658 0.977 0.866 0.811 0.682 0.780 0.718
Czech 
Republic 0.611 0.554 0.536 0.504 0.554 0.518 0.687 0.656
Estonia 0.547 0.492 0.503 0.430 0.609 0.566 0.777 0.722
Hungary 0.752 0.653 0.763 0.681 0.719 0.628 0.700 0.656
Latvia 0.784 0.627   0.790 0.627 0.769 0.693
Lithuania 0.751 0.645   0.606 0.564 0.870 0.801
Moldova 0.665 0.598 0.525 0.485 0.560 0.521 0.664 0.637
Poland 0.624 0.571 0.678 0.617 0.663 0.620 0.726 0.685
Romania 0.708 0.636 0.759 0.682 0.706 0.629 0.733 0.682
Slovak 
Republic   0.647 0.608 0.552 0.519 0.768 0.726
Slovenia 0.702 0.616 0.673 0.621 0.927 0.781 0.912 0.814
Mean 0.693 0.605 0.673 0.611 0.682 0.605 0.762 0.708
Source: DDP Quick Query database of WDI & GDF, World Bank.
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In order to compute Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) accurately, one 
should match the supported and unsupported firms precisely on the basis of the pro-
pensity score. Table 5 shows the results of the ATT for key outcomes. That is, it shows 
the difference between the average outcomes for the firms with overdraft facility policy 
and the average outcomes of those same firms had they not had overdraft facility policy. 
The results indicate that the sole statistically significant impact attributable to overdraft 
facility policy is that these firms have a higher incidence of doing R&D activities. The 
sign of the coefficients representing the impact of overdraft facility on expenditures 
of R&D activities is positive but only statistically significant in Metals and machinery 
sector.
5.2.3. Assessing matching quality
The quality of the propensity score match is conditional on the validity of the condi-
tional independence assumption. That is, the treatment and control groups should be as 
similar as possible and have no significant differences in terms of observable and unob-
servable characteristics. Table 6 shows that following the match observable statistically 
significant differences between the treatment and control group exist. 
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However, to identify a causal relationship, matching requires that the treatment and 
control groups be similar in unmeasured characteristics. It is uncertain how likely this 
assumption is because treated firms had the initiative to apply to overdraft facility while 
the control did not, and there may be other unobserved differences between the treat-
ment and the control group (e.g., the degree of entrepreneurship and quality of manage-
ment teams). 
6. Summary and discussion of results
This research evaluates the impact of overdraft facility policy, for recipient firms by 
controlling the selection bias with the up-to-date propensity score matching technique. 
The results are based on an investigation of the differences in the performance indicators 
from 2005, for the firms receiving overdraft facility policy.
In 2005, growth in the eight new European Union (EU) member States from Central 
and Eastern Europe (EU-8) economies had become more broadly based, driven by ro-
bust consumption and investment expenditure and strengthening external demand. On 
the other hand, most Southern and Eastern European economies had preserved a strong 
growth momentum in 2005. Finally, macroeconomic policy in most of these countries 
had remained restrictive.
For all of these factors, 2005 have been chosen to establish performance baseline and 
establish the impact of overdraft facility policy. In this context, the empirical analysis in 
Eastern European Union Industrial firms showed that the overdraft facility policy would 
be needed to stimulate investment in R&D, which will eventually result in growth in 
productivity. We could not find sufficient evidence that the overdraft facility has affected 
positively technical efficiency, production workers trained, and sales export activity.
In terms of policy implications, these findings show that overdraft facility generic pro-
grams may not be the best way to increase efficiency or productivity. It would be better 
to design intervention strategies targeted toward specific sectors and micro-drivers. In 
the context of the European Union this is much more important since usually there is 
a tendency to generate general incentive policies that do not take into account the ef-
ficiency determinants at the sector level.
However, since this research was based on relatively short period of time not accom-
panied with significant changes in overdraft facility schemes, the comparative analyses 
regarding the changes on the parameters were not possible. The designing of these pa-
rameters to reach the optimal level could remain as an interesting further research topic.
On the other hand, comparing with today situation, we have been conducting our em-
pirical analysis in a very different economic scenario. In this context, a longitudinal 
study with new data could provide a greater richness to the results, capturing the effects 
that persist over time. Extensions of future research could be aimed at addressing the 
limitations discussed.
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